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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSITY CLUB, a non-profit
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
- vs Jl\TVESCO HOLDING
LORPORATION, a New York
corporation, and WASATCH REAL1Y
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Defendan:s-Respondents

Case No.
12792

AP·PELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORI1Y ON ISSUE OF
WHETHER RENT ABATEMENT IS LESSEE'S
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY.
Under POINT I of its original brief, plaintiff-appellant
I hertinafter referred to as "Club") argued that the lower court
trred in holding that the Club's sole and exclusive remedy for
Lessor's breach of the lease was rent abatement. In the course
of the argument, the Club noted that there is no language in
the lease which even suggests that rent abatement is to be
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the exclusive remedy; rent abatement is merely an additional
remedy available to the Club in the event the Club wished to
pursue such remedy.

In further support of this argument, the Club calls the
Court's attention to the case of Bethers v. Wood, 10 Utah 2a
313, 352 P.2d 774 (1960).
In the Bethers case, plaintiff sued to recover a sum of
money alleged to be due him under the terms of a subcontract
Defendant counterclaimed alleging a right of setoff for dam·
ages sustained by reason of plaintiff's delay in furnishing gravel.
The lower court dismissed the counterclaim on the ground that
the defendant's exclusive remedy for plaintiff's delay in fur·
nishing gravel was recovery of expenses; defendant could not
recover damages.
The contractual prov1s1on which the trial court in the
Bethers case regarded as constituting an exclusive remedy was
as follows:
"Delivery of materials to keep up as directed, behind
grading equipment at all times. Should contractor
have to assume charge on account of delay by sub·
contractor, the expense accrued therein will be deducted
from the contract price. Contractor to receive gravel
at site of crushing plant in the bin . . . The contrac
tor agrees to make no demand for liquidated damages
or penalty for delay in any sum in excess of such
amount as may be specifically named in the
. . . That no claim for services rendered or matenals
furnished by the contractor to the subcontractor shall
be valid unless written notice thereof is given by the
contractor to the subcontractor during the first ten
days of the calendar month following that in which the
claim originated."
2

The contractural prov1s1on m the Bethers case and the
lease provisions in the instant case are similar in that they
provide for a deduction from amounts otherwise due the other
rnntracting party. Moreover, in both cases, the remedy was
clearly specified, but there was no language to suggest that
such remedy must be pursued to the exclusion of other remedies.
This Court held that the lower court erred in construing
said remedy to be exclusive. The Court called attention to the
fact that by use of the word "should" in the second sentence
of the quoted language, the parties recognized that a delay
might not cause a charge or expense on the part of the detendant and therefore the parties could not have intended the
remedy to be exclusive. Similarly, the use of the work "if"
mparagraph 19 of the lease in question shows that the parties
recognized that a breach by the Lessor may not render the
premises untenantable but may still cause damage to Lessee.
Thus, the parties could not have intended rent abatement to
be the exclusive remedy.
Concerning the contention that the provisions constituted
an exclusive remedy, this Court held:
". . . This section merely afforded the defendant an
additional remedy in the event of breach by delay. He
was entitled to this specific remedy, or he could at
his election pursue any other remedies which the law
affords."
The Court further stated that the intent to designate a
remedy as being exclusive must be expressly stated in the contract under the proper rules of construction.
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Although the Uniform Commercial Code does not govern
the instant case, the Code provisions are persuasive as a recent
expressior:, of the Legislature with respect to exclusive remt
dies. The Code states:
" . . . Resort to a remedy as provided is optional un.
less the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in
which case it is the sole remedy. Utah Code Annotated,
§ 70A-2-719 (l)(b).
Since there is no indication whatsoever in the lease tha1
the parties intended the rent abatement provisions to consntute an exclusive remedy, the district court erred in
that it was the only remedy available to the Club.

POINT

II

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF DEMONSTRATES THE
EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS.
The main emphasis of Lessor's brief is to argue the fact1,
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. POINT I of Les·
sor's brief was dedicated entirely to the proposition that certain ·
facts or inferences should be considered to the exclusion ol
other facts and inferences. These arguments by their verr
nature demonstrate the existence of factual disputes, and estab·
lish that the summary judgment should be reversed.
This Court has clearly stated that in reviewing an order
granting a motion for summary judgment, all facts and in·
ferences should be resolved in favor of the party against whorn
the summary judgment was granted:
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"The party against whom the summary judgment is
granted, is entitled to the benefit of having the court
consider all of the facts presented, and every inference
fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to
him; which we do in reviewing the incident. Morris v.
Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297
(1953). Accord, Kidman v. White, 14 U.2d 142, 378
P.2d 898 ( 1963) ;Richards v. Anderson, 9 U.2d 25,
337 P.2d 410 ( 1959); AutoLease Co. v. Central Mutual lnsttrance Co., 7 U.2d 336, 325 P.2d 264 ( 1958) ."
On the basis of these authorities, the att::mpts by Lessor
to pfrsuade the Court to uphold the summary judgment because certain facts and inferences should be preferred over
other facts and inferences serves only to demonstrate the error
in granting the judgment in the first instance. The Club will
herein nute the factual disputes argued in Lessor's brief. No
attempt will be made in this brief to repeat the additional fact,al disr:iutes noted in the Club's original brief.
On pages 5 and 8 of its brief, Lessor states that nowhere
in the l<:tter of July 22, 1969 did the Club call attention to its
right to cure the Lessor's default. However, the second to
last paragraph of said letter clearly states: "We call your attention to paragraphs . . . 29 of our lease . . . " Since paragraph 29 of the lease concerns defaults by Lessor and the right
of the Club to cure defaults, it is difficult to understand how
Lessor can in good conscience assert that no reference was made
to the Club's right to cure the breach. Lessor was well aware
at the time that the replacement unit was discussed that the
Club was relying on its rights to cure Lessor's default under paragraph 29 of the lease.
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On pages 5 and 6 of its brief, Lessor reproduces a major
portion of the letter of July 23, 1969. By the use of italici
Lessor attempts to characterize the letter as indicating an in.
tent to waive the Club's right of reimbursement under para
graph 29 of the lease. In so doing, there is no mention of the
relevant facts surrounding the preparation of that letter. The
body of the letter was unilaterally prepared by Lessor's attar·
ney (Miller deposition, pp. 7, 9) . There is no question bur
that Lessor's attorney prepared the letter in an attempt to forct
the Ch.<b to waive all of its right to reimbursement for the ne11
air conditioning unit. However, the fact remains, that the
letter was unacceptable to the Club and therefore the conclua
ing paragraph was added with the express intent by both
parties ( R. 81-82, Miller Dep., pp. 11-13) that the Club woula
retain its rights under the lease regardless of the content of the
letter. The Club is entitled to have these facts considered bi
a jury so that the intent of the parties can be accurately ascer·
tained. The mere quotation of the language unilaterally chosen
by Lessor's attorney cannot be considered to the exclusion ot
the other relevant facts of the case. All of the facts should be
considered and these facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the Club at this point in the proceeding.
Realizing that its argument involves factual disputes,
Lessor has attempted to resolve the dispute by claiming on
page 7 of its brief that the facts which dispute its version ol
the facts are "based on incompetent evidence." The brief
then goes on to raise a long series of factual disputes without
ever noting why the contrary facts are "incompetent."
On pages 9-11 of its brief, Lessor speculates that there is
a possibility that if the facts had not occurred as they did.

6

1

1

)Or

!Cl,

Ja

tht

'he
Or·

iur

e11

er·
en

ot
be

JSt

es,
ol

icf

1UI

JS

id,

Lessor may have been able to provide temporary air conditioning until the main unit could be restored or repaired. There is
absolutely no evidence whatsoever that suggests even the possibility that a temporary unit could have been installed within
the 30-day period specified in paragraph 29 of the lease. Had
such claim been made in the court below, it would have been
controverted by the Club because, in fact, such temporary air
conditioning was not available. Lessor had a full opportunity
to present such evidence by way of affidavit, but no evidence
was presented. Now Lessor chooses to speculate that temporary
,1ir conditioning could have been substituted during the 30<lay period. If the case is remanded for trial as we contend
it should be, Lessor will have full opportunity to present such
evidence at the trial. However, on a motion for summary judgmen;.
such as this cannot be assumed in favor of
any party, especially the party who prevailed on the summary
Judgment.
On pages 10-11 of its brief, Lessor argues that the Club
deprived Lessor of the opportunity to perform within 30-days
by purchasing the replacement unit and thereby removing the
need for Lessor to perform. The argument presupposes that
the Club's purchase of the replacement was contrary to the will
of Lessor and wrongfully prevented Lessor from performance.
This is simply not the fact. It was Lessor who stated it could
not replace the unit for 3 months ( R. 80) and it was Lessor
who conceived of the idea of purchasing the replacement unit
I R 80-81 ) . Moreover, Lessor suggested the replacement
with full knowledge that the Club intended to make the purchase pursuant to its right of reimbursement under paragraph
29 of the lease ( R. 64-6 5, 80-81 ) . Under these facts, it is

7

difficult to find any reasonable basis for Lessor to argue that it
was wrongfully deprived of the opportunity to perform.
On page 11 of its brief, Lessor chooses to infer from
the facts that the purchase of the new unit by the Club was
"unilateral action." However, the availability of the unit was
made known to the Club by a representative of the Lessor ana
from this fact and from the evidence stated in the Bullen aff1.
davit ( R. 79-82), a jury would be amply justified in finding
that both parties were fully aware of the situation and cooper
ated in the purchase.
On page 11 of its brief, Lessor suggests that the claim,
of fraud, duress and undue influence should be excluded from
the case since they were never pleaded. It should be noted tha1 .
the claims of fraud, duress and undue influence were asserted:
only with respect to the letter of July 23, 1969. The CluD
contends the letter is a nullity since the body of the letter pur
ports to waive paragraph 29 of the lease and the addendum
reinstates it. For this reason the letter was not mentioned in
the complaint and there was no reason to mention fraud, or
duress at that point in the proceeding. The letter was first
mentioned in Lessor's answer. Since the Club is not permitted
to respond to the answer, the Club did not have the opportunit)'
to raise the issues of fraud, duress and undue influence in the
pleading stage of the case. However, the issues was tirnelj
raised and placed before the court at the hearing on the motion
for summary judgment ( R. 88-89) .
Throughout the brief, and more particularly on pages
11-12, Lessor asserts that a jury would be compelled to con·
elude that the free donation of space and use of the water rower
8

constituted the consideration for the Club's waiver of its right
to reimbursement under paragraph 29 of the lease. However,
a jury could reasonably conclude that these concessions were
consideration for the Club advancing funds for the purchase
and installation of the replacement unit, which was required
in order for Lessor to fulfill its obligations under the lease.
On page 12 of its brief, Lessor attempts to persuade the
Court to find that the purchase by the Club of the replacement
unit OCLurred after the meeting of July 23 and thus Lessor could
nut :,ave been guilty of duress by taking advantage of the Club's
commitment to purchase. Again, Lessor argues with the facts.
Paragraph 7 of Mr. Bullen's affidavit (R. 81) clearly and unequivocally states that the purchase had been made prior to
the meeting of July 23.
On page 12 of its brief, Lessor states that the purchase of
the replacement unit "with the acquiescence of defendant" is an
incompetent conclusion. The basis of the claim of incompetency
is that the Bullen affidavit does not state what Lessor said or did
in this regard. However, paragraphs 6, 8 and 9 of the Bullen
affidavit ( R. 80, 81) describes the acts and representations of
Lessor and the description was from the personal knowledge
ot Mr. Bullen who was present at the meeting. Lessor goes on
to state that Lessor's acquiescence in the purchase of the replacement unit by the Club cannot be inferred from the fact
that prior to any purported waiver of rights under paragraph
29 of the lease Lessor informed the Club of the availability of
the replacement unit and advised the Club that the unit must
be purchased immediately. Such an argument with the facts
rs improper at this stage of the proceeding. It is for a jury
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to determine whether these facts justify the inference that Lessor
acquiesced and cooperated in the purchase.
On page 13 of its brief, Lessor asserts a series of argu.
ments with the facts numbered 1-4. First, Lessor asserts thar
it did not breach the lease by the breakdo.wn of the air conditioning since paragraph 29 required that the default must last
for a period of 30 days. However, it should be noted that there
is no 30-day requirement with regard to paragraphs 10, 16,
and 19 of the lease. These provisions require Lessor to provide quiet enjoyment for the "full term of the lease", furnish
air conditioning at a comfortable temperature "at all times" and
maintain the air conditioning equipment in good repair and
Lessor failed to perform each of these obligations. Furthermore,
the doctrine of anticipatory breach nullified the 30-day require·
ment as to paragraph 29 (See pp. 25-28 of the Club's original
brief) . Second, Lessor asserts that it did not have knowledge
that the Club had purchased the unit when the meeting was
called on July 23, 1969. However, the
of the letter
of July 2 3 ( R. 66) will justify a finding that they did have
such knowledge. The introductory paragraph of that letter
states the purpose of the letter as setting forth terms and conditions under which the unit would be installed. There would
be no need to agree upon terms of installation of the unit which
was not yet purchased. Furthermore, the suggestion of the
availability of the unit by Lessor several days prior to July 2)
was accompanied by a statement that it must be immediate!)
purchased. This permits the inference that Lessor knew or had
reason to know that the purchase had been completed by July
23. Third, Lessor asserts that the unit had not been purchased
by July 23. This is directly contradicted by the affidavit of
10

Mr. Bullen, paragraph 7 ( R. 81 ) . Finally, Lessor asserts that
rhe unit was not purchased through "joint effort", which conflicts with the evidence as above noted.
On page 14 of its brief, Lessor quotes the deposition of
Marion Miller, Lessor's building manager, and argues that her
testimony should not be taken literally because she was a new
employee and was not totally aware of the problem. An argument as to the weight to be given to the testimony of Mrs.
Miller is a matter to be considered by a jury. If Mrs. Miller's
[t:,timony is to be weighed due to the circumstances noted by
Lessor, a jury must decide on the weight of that testimony rather
than the court on a motion for summary judgment.
On pages 14-15 of its brief, Lessor asserts that there was
no basis to infer that Lessor took advantage of the commitment by the Club to purchase the replacement unit. Again, the
tacts do not compel the inference Lessor chooses to make on
this motion for summary judgment. The fact remains that the
discussion concerning the purchase of the new unit was made
with the expectation of reimbursement. There is no suggestion
whatrnever in the record that during the discussion for the
purchase of the replacement unit that either party intended that
the lease provisions for reimbursement would not govern the
situatio!!. In fact, both parties expressed their intent that the
lease was in full force and effect (see quotation from record
in Club's original brief, pages 30-31; see also Bullen affidavit,
R. 81-82). It was only after Lessor had contracted to purchase
the unit that there was any suggestion that the reimbursement
provisions of the lease would not govern the rights of the
parries in this situation.
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Lessor's argument with the facts is very apparent on page
15 of its brief. At that point Lessor states that the record
devoid of any suggestion that the "representatives of the club
refused to waive their reimbursement rights of paragraph 29
of the lease." Paragraph 8 of the Bullen affidavit (R. 81)
clearly and unequivocally states in language understandable to
everyone except Lessor as follows:
"Since we had understood the unit was to be installed
on the account of defendant, we refused to sign the
letter since the substance indicated otherwise. However,
under threat that space would not be made available to
a unit already purchased and scheduled to be installed
we agreed to sign the letter only after adding a clause
which appears at the end of the letter so that the put· 1
chase and installation would remain on the account oi !
defendants.
'
It was our understanding, and our stated purpose
to the representative of defendants at the meeting, that
the purchase and installation of the unit would be on
the account of defendants and that the addition of the
clause was intended as a statement of that purpose."
Despite this clear statement on the record, Lessor con·
eludes on page 15 of its brief: "Nowhere does the record
show any discussion of waiver of rights under paragraph 29 of
the
The above quotation from the Bullen affidavit di·
reedy contradicts Lessor's assertion.
Lessor's brief goes on to state that Bullen's version of what
occured at the meeting is "a pure incompetent conclusion on
his part anyway, for he does not say what defendant said." The
Club cannot conceive of any means other than that used in the
affadivit to state the substance of what was said at the meeting.
Bullen was present at the meeting, heard and participated in che
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discussion and in paragraphs 8 and 9 of his affidavit he related
under oath the substance of what was stated by the parties. His
version of the substance of the conversation under no circumstances could be considered an incompetent conclusion. Moreover, his version of the discussion is corroborated to a large
extent by the testimony of Mrs. Miller (Miller deposition,
Page 13).
One of the most flagrant misstatements of fact is contained on pages 15-16 of Lessor's brief. At that point Lessor
states that the record is devoid of any evidence that the parties
did not intend to alter or amend the lease. This statement is
made in complete disregard of the testimony of Mrs. Miller
set out verbatim and quoted in its entirety on pages 30-31 of
the Club's original brief and the testimony of Mr. Bullen in
paragraphs 8 and 9 of his affidavit ( R. 81). Mrs. Miller clearly
and unequivocally states that it was her impression that the
parties did not intend to amend or alter the lease. She also
clearly and unequivocally stated that her impression was based
upon statements which Mr. Jeffries had made to her or to
others during the course of the meeting. Mr. Jefferies was the
spokesman for Lessor at the meeting (Miller's deposition, p.
l3) . Mrs. Miller was present during said meeting, she was
the signatory to the letter agreement of July 23, and is perfectly
competent to relate the expressions of intent made during the
course of the meeting. Her version of the stated intent of the
parties is corroborated by Bullen's affidavit (R. 81). So that
there will be no question concerning Lessor's assertion in this
regard, the Club invites the Court to again review the testimony which is quoted in full on pages 30-31 of the Club's
original brief.
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At the conclusion of Point I, Lessor asserts for the first
time in this proceeding that the matter should be decided on
the basis of paragraph 31 (alterations to the premises) rather
than paragraph 29 of the lease (Club's right to reimbursement
for curing Lessor's default) . Since the issue was not raised in
the trial court, it should not be considered in this Court. Even
if considered, the argument has no merit. Alteration of the
premises was insignificant and occured incidental to the Club's
curing of the Lessor's breach. At all times the parties considered
the problem as being governed by the reimbursement provisions
of paragraph 29 of the lease. Lessor regarded paragraph 29 as
the only relevant provision as shown by its preparation of the
letter of July 23 (R. 66). The Club regarded paragraph 29
as the only relevant provision as stated in its letter on July 22
(R. 64) and the Bullen affidavit, paragraph 8 and 9 (R. 81).
To the extent that Lessor claims consent was required in
order for the Club to obtain reimbursement, the jury could
reasonably conclude from the facts stated in the Bullen affidavit that consent was given. There is no requirement of consent in paragraph 29 of the lease.
POINT

III

THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT CONCERNING APPLICATION OF RELEASE PROVISIONS, RENT ABATEMENT PROVISIONS, DURESS AND NEGLIGENCE.
Under Point II of its brief, page 17, Lessor argues that
the provisoins of paragraph 19 release Lessor from all liability
in this case. Realizing that paragraph 19 does not purpcrt to
release any of the obligations under paragraphs 10 and 16,

14

Lessor states that the Club had not pleaded a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment (lease paragraph 10) or a
breach of the utilities covenant (lease paragraph 16). On the
contrary, the complaint clearly and unequivocally alleges a
breach of these covenants. The covenants themselves were
quoted in paragraph 5 of the complaint ( R. 2). Paragraph 5
of the complaint is a part of or incorporated by reference into
all counts of the complaint.
The alleged release clause (lease paragraph 19, R. 50-51)
is the basis for the lower court's decision Lessor was not liable
for damages and that the Club's exclusive remedy was rent
abatement. However, paragraph 19 purports to release Lessor
from liability only in the event Lessor fails to make the repairs specified in that paragraph. It does not purport or even
suggest a release from paragraph 10 (quiet enjoyment), paragraph 16 (utilities including air conditioning) or paragraph
29 (Lessee's right to cure default) and should not have been
used as a basis to limit the Club's recovery to rent abatement.
Beginning on page 19 of its brief, Lessor argues that the
provisions of paragraph 19, which purport to release Lessor
from liability arising out of damages to property of the Club,
includes loss of profits.
At the outset, it should be noted, that it makes no difference whether loss of profits is included or excluded from the
term "property" since the release provisions are not operative
until certain disputes of fact are resolved. In this regard, see
pages 19-2 5 of our original brief. Even if operable, the purported release provisions do not effect Lessor's liability under
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paragraphs 10 and 16 of the lease. Therefore, a decision as
to whether the term "property" includes loss of profits is unnecessary at this point in the proceeding.
Lessor's argument that "property" includes loss of profits
as based upon an annotation written in 1925 and the Nebraska
case of Wood vs. Security Mutual Life Insurance Co., 198
N.W. 573, decided in 1924. The Wood case is not in point
since it involved a liberal construction of the term whereas the
relevant law in the instant case compels a narrow construction
of the term. Moreover, the more recent view, noted in the
cases cited in the Club's original brief, supports a construe·
tion excluding the loss of profits from the term "property".
The only Utah case cited by Lessor was Clayton vs. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956). The case involved
the constitutionality of a licensing statute and has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of lost profits or the meaning of
the term "property" in a contractual provision.
Lessor ignores the Utah cases cited in the Club's prior
brief which compel a narrow construction of the term "prop·
erty," and calls attention to cases from other jurisdictions in
support of its proposition. The recent cases dealing with the
issue, and the rules of construction heretofore establish by this
Court, compel the conclusion that the term "property" must
be strictly construed against Lessor in this matter and the term
must be taken in its ordinary meaning in the absence of language
to specify otherwise.
Lessor cites Lee and Eastes vs. Public Service Commission.
328 P.2d 700 (Wash. 1958), in support of its argument. That
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case involves the liberal construction of the Washington statute
rath::'r than the construction of a contractual term in circumsrances where strict construction should be followed. Moreover,
the case made a distinction between "property" on the one
hand, and "property right" on the other. The former deals with
property itself whereas the latter deals with the right to use
properry and obtain prof it therefrom. The case did not hold,
nor did it even suggest, that property is the equivalent of the
righc to earn a profit.
In further support of its argument, Lessor asserts that it
is difficult to imagine how the failure to repair air conditioning
mule! result in damage to tangible property and therefore
the parties must have intended the term to include intangible
propert)'. A reading of the lease provision itself illustrates the
complete lack of merit to his argument. Under paragraph 19,
Lessor was obliged not only to keep the air conditioning in
good repair, but also roof, awnings, exterior and structural
portions of the premises, pipes, wires, conduits, sewers, drains,
elevators, elevator shafts; stairways, signs and heating. It is
apparent when the entire paragraph is considered that the
parties contemplated damage to tangible property. Moreover,
even if the air conditioning were the only item mentioned in the
paragraph, the failure to maintain the system could destroy
perishable food items and leakage from the system could destroy any number of tangible items.
On page 19 of its brief, Lessor asserts the following:
"Plaintiff urges this proposition: when two lease clauses
provide the tenant is to receive quiet enjoyment to, and
air conditioning for, the premises, and a third clause
provides on failure to maintain the air conditioning
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equipment property damages are waived, t
ages are not so waived. Plaintiff cites no aw
ever for that proposition."

On rhe contrary, the Club has cited the best authc
proposition: paragraph 19 of the lease. The all
provisions of paragraph 19 are not applicable unti
fact determines that repairs were made "with du
Even if repairs are made with due diligence said
applicable only to the covenant to make repairs 5
in the same paragraph. The alleged release provisi
graph 19 do not waive any claims in the event of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment (paragraph 10) c
ant to furnish air conditioning and to maintain 1
at a comfortable temperature (paragraph 16). Th
court could conclude as a matter of law that repai
six weeks were made "with due diligence," summa
should not have been granted since there could b
of liability under paragraphs 10 and 16 of the lea:

In an attempt to argue that a factual detei

not raised by the words "with due diligence," Le5
on page 24 of its brief, that the Court should o
the short period between the breakdown and the
the Club undertook to remedy the Lessor's defaul
comrels the conclusion that the relevant time perio
3 months that Lessor stated would be involved (R
six weeks that were actually involved (Miller de
3 3 ) . It was the representation, that replacemen
valve two or three months, which compelled the Cl
take Lessor's obligations and therefore his period o
one that should be considered in determining wh(
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pairs were made "with due diligence" (See Club's original
brief, pp. 25-28). Had Lessor represented that it might be able
to restore service within the 30-day period, the Club would
obviously not have acted.
Lessor asserts that the record does not support a claim
of negligence. On the conrary, the record establishes and Lessor ,1dmits on page 24 of its brief that the air conditioning
failure occurred by reason of the acts of persons hired by Lessor. Lessor has not cited any portion of the record which purports to establish that the guilty party was not its servant under
the circumstances. Rather, Lessor asks the Court to speculate
as to the identity of the principal of the negligent party. The
agency of the party who damaged the system is a factual determination which should not be decided summarily as a matter of law. Goddard v. Lexington Motor Co., 63 Utah 161,
223 Pac. 340 (1924).
With regard to the reimbursement provisions of the lease,
covered in point 3 of the Club's initial brief, one point should
be clearly specified. The exculpatory provisions in paragraph
19, if applicable at all, do not apply to the reimbursement
provisions of paragraph 29 of the same lease. It is absurd to
argue that the parties intended that the release provisions of
paragraph 19 released Lessor from the obligation later specified in the same lease. Therefore, regardless of the effect of
the exculpatory provision, the reimbursemnt provision of paragraph 29 remains in full force and effect.
At several points during Lessor's argument, 1t 1s speculated that Lessor could have repaired the unit at an earlier
point in time. It should be noted that this assertion is merely
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speculative, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that
the system was repairable nor is there any indication as to how
long repairs, if any, would have taken. Since the unit wa1
ultimately replaced rather than repaired (Miller deposition, p.
33), the only available evidence suggests that the repain
were not an acceptable alternative.

In its argument against the application of the doctrine
of duress, Lessor notes a series of assertions which amount to
nothing more than speculation or a statement of facts in dis·
pute. On page 27, Lessor argues that the Club had retained all
of its bargaining power as evidenced by the deletion in the
letter agreement of July 23 wherein Lessor undertook the re·
sponsibility of paying electricity for the unit. This is mereli
an attempt by Lessor to distract the Court from the overall pie·
ture by calling attention to a single fact. Considering all of the
facts, the record establishes that after the system became in·
operable the Lessor acknowledged that it could not restore
service within 30 days. The Club noted its right to cure the
default at Lessor's expense and in response thereto Lessor
noted the availability of a replacement unit without any indica·
tion that the reimbursement provisions would be contested
The Club purchased the unit and only then did Lessor disclailll
any right to reimbursement. By the use of threats not to allo11
installation of the unit already purchased at substantial cosr
did the Club sign the July 23 letter. Certainly a jury could
reasonably conclude that the letter was signed under duress as
that term is defined by the cases cited in the Club's original
brief. The existence or absence of duress is a factual determi·
nation, 25 Am. ]ur. "Duress and Undue Influence", § 34. The
factual argument concerning the issue of fraud and duress
demonstrates the need for a trial.
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ge 28 Lessor speculates that the Club perhaps could
led its air conditioning purchase and argues that the
d no evidence as to whether it could or could not
agraph 7 of the Bullen affidavit ( R. 81), clearly
the purchase had already been made and arrange1stallation had been completed. The detailed factual
ch Lessor wishes to argue, can only be presented
de trial of the matter. The nature of this assertion
)nly emphasizes the fact that the matter was inly decided on a motion for summary judgment.

tges 27 and 31 of its brief, Lessor argues that if
isaffirms the "contract" it cannot retain the beneapparently misunderstands the issues. The Club
aim that the lease was the result of duress; only
:ed amendment of July 23 is the result of duress.
ttempted amendment is declared void, the parties
matter in accordance with the lease contract. The
10t attempted to avoid any obligation under the
only attempt to avoid obligations under the lease
part of Lessor when it prepared the letter of July
ub seeks to retain the benefits under the lease as it is
has not attempted to avoid the obligations.
CONCLUSION

ghout its brief, Lessor characterizes the facts in an
present a picture that simply does not exist. Or,
ularly, if the picture does exist, such should be the
i jury rather than that of the Court on a summary
The characterization of the facts of which Lessor
e as follows: After the failure of the air condition-
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ing system, the Club decided that they wanted their own system
independent from that of the building; the Club wanted a sep.
arate system enough to expend in excess of $15 ,000 and in
addition to this expenditure, waive an already existing right to
be reimbursed for this expenditure; Lessor consented to make
great sacrifices in allowing the system to be tied into the
water tower (which would not result in any additional water
use since the main system also used the water tower) , consented
to pay for electricity and costs of maintaennce (which they
were already obliged to do under the lease at the time of the
breakdown), and donate space to accomodate the new unir
(which space was unusable for any other purpose). In exchange for these "generous" concessions, the Club waived its
right to be reimbursed for the purchase of the system, a right
which was well established under the terms of its lease.
The whole point of the matter is that the following ver·
sion of the facts, as contended by the Club, if not more prob·
able, are at least a reasonable conclusion to be made from the
evidence: The air conditioning system failed, leaving the prem·
ises untenantable for the purposes for which the Club used the
premises. Representatives of the Club were faced with an emer·
gency situation and reviewed the provisions of the lease which
allowed them to replace the air conditioning system on the ac·
count of Lessor under paragraph 29 of the lease. On July 22,
the Club formally notified Lessor of this right. Discussions
with Lessor definitely established that the default could not be
cured within the 30 day period established by paragraph 29
All parties realizing that paragraph 29 was operable, immedi·
ately cooperated to find the most economic manner in which
to cure Lessor's default and get the Club back into operation.
Their cooperative effort resulted in the location of a replace
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ment unit. The Club purchased the unit and made arrangements for its installation upon the understanding that it would
be reimbursed by Lessor. After the unit was PU!chased, Lessor
attempted to pursuade the Club to bear the expense contrary
to the lease. This attempted shift of the expense was done by
presenting the letter of July 23. The Club refused to sign the
same since it did not wish to waive its rights to reimbursement
which it believed were provided for by the lease. Thus, it was
suggested and agreed that the addendum be added so that
it woulc! be clear that the Club retained all rights under the lease.
Despite the attempt to shift the burden, Lessor accepted the
addendum and arrangements were made to accommodate the
unit. Lessor donated space which was not usable for any other
purpose and allowed the unit to be tied into the water tower,
and continued its obligation under the original lease to provide
for maintenance.
It is apparent from the facts before the Court that there
is a genuine issue as to almost all of the material facts and that
summary judgment should be reversed and the case remanded
for trial.
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